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We initiate the study of mechanisms with veriﬁcation for one-parameter agents. We give
an algorithmic characterization of such mechanisms and show that they are provably
better than mechanisms without veriﬁcation, i.e., those previously considered in the
literature. These results are obtained for a number of optimization problems motivated
by the Internet and recently studied in the algorithmic mechanism design literature. The
characterization can be regarded as an alternative approach to existing techniques to design
truthful mechanisms. The construction of such mechanisms reduces to the construction of
an algorithm satisfying certain “monotonicity” conditions which, for the case of veriﬁcation,
are much less stringent. In other words, veriﬁcation makes the construction easier and the
algorithm more eﬃcient (both computationally and in terms of approximability).
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The emergence of the Internet as the platform for distributed computing has posed interesting questions on how to
design eﬃcient solutions which account for the lack of a “central authority” [5,9,10]. This aspect is certainly a key ingredient
for the success of the Internet and, probably, of any “popular” system that one can envision (peer-to-peer systems are
a notable example of this type of anarchic systems). In their seminal works, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [5] and Nisan
and Ronen [9] suggest a game-theoretic approach in which the various “components” of the system are modeled as selﬁsh
agents: each agent performs a “strategy” which results in the highest utility for herself. For instance, each agent may control
a link of a communication network and each link has a cost for transmitting (i.e., for using it). This cost depends on the
type of the link and a protocol that wishes to establish a minimum-cost path between two nodes would have to ask the
agents for the type of the corresponding link [2,9]. An agent may thus have a higher utility by misreporting her type
(e.g., untruthfully report that her link is of a “very slow” type in order to induce the protocol to forward packets through
“somebody else’s” link or to receive a higher payment in reward). Nisan and Ronen [9] propose a mechanism design approach
that combines an underlying algorithm (e.g., a shortest-path algorithm) with a suitable payment function (e.g., how much
we pay an agent for using her link). The payment rule is used to ensure that no agent will ﬁnd convenient to misreport her
type. One of the strongest and most studied solution concepts in game theory is that of truthful mechanism: every agent can
maximize her own utility simply by reporting truthfully her type, no matter which strategy the other agents follow. In other
words, truthtelling is a dominant strategy for all agents. The main interest in truthful mechanisms stems from the need of
“protocols” which do not assume an “altruistic” behavior of the involved parties [9]. In an ideal scenario, the involved parties
will never “cheat” and thus some underlying algorithm will be able to compute a “globally” optimal solution. In practice the
algorithm runs on inputs provided by the selﬁsh agents. This motivates the need for truthful mechanisms to make sure that
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a central question is (algorithmic) game theory is:
Which algorithms can be turned into a truthful mechanism?
This question can be rephrased in terms of combinatorial optimization problems and algorithms that solve them optimally
or approximately [2,9]:
Which problems admit optimal truthful mechanisms?
What is the best approximation ratio of a truthful mechanism?
These questions have been raised ﬁrst by Nisan and Ronen [9] who considered the “selﬁsh version” of the classical
problem of scheduling unrelated machines: each machine belongs to a selﬁsh agent who reports the type of the machine,
that is, how long it will take to execute different jobs on that machine. For this problem, they showed that no truthful
mechanism can achieve an approximation factor better than 2, in spite of the fact that (1 + ε)-approximations can be
achieved by polynomial-time algorithms for every ε > 0. Moreover, existing mechanism design techniques guarantee only
n-approximations, with n being the number of machines. Nisan and Ronen [9] then introduce a new paradigm called
mechanisms with veriﬁcation: the idea is that the mechanism can observe the jobs completion times and gain some “partial”
information on the type of the machines. These additional information allows for more powerful mechanisms, since they
can guarantee exact solutions for this scheduling problem. So, a natural question that arises is whether veriﬁcation helps for
other problems involving selﬁsh agents:
What is the power of veriﬁcation?
This work addresses precisely this question. In particular, we apply the basic idea of Nisan and Ronen [9] to an im-
portant and well-studied class of problems with one-parameter agents [2,8]. Our results relate to all questions above since
we provide a characterization of truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation for very general settings. From this result we obtain
truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation for several optimizations problems considered in the literature. The approximation
ratio of these mechanisms outperforms the best-known mechanisms which do not use veriﬁcation. Moreover, for several of
these problems, the approximation ratio achievable with veriﬁcation is provably better than the approximation ratio that
any mechanism “without veriﬁcation” can achieve. Finally, our characterization explains in a simple and natural way why
mechanisms with veriﬁcation are more powerful for one-parameter agents. Indeed, truthful mechanisms (without veriﬁca-
tion) are characterized by so-called monotone algorithms [2,8]. Mechanisms with veriﬁcation relax this condition and allows
to use what we call in this paper roughly monotone algorithms. For several problems, roughly monotone algorithms can
achieve optimal solutions, while the best monotone algorithm must have a worse approximation factor.
Our interest in one-parameter agents is twofold. First, since these problems have been well understood for the case
without veriﬁcation, the study of mechanisms with veriﬁcation in this setting gives us precise indications about the “power
of veriﬁcation.” (Namely, that we need only a weaker condition on the algorithm, thus making the construction of a mecha-
nism simpler and more eﬃcient for certain problems.) Second, there are several applications which can be easily modeled in
terms of one-parameter agents and naturally ﬁt in the model of mechanisms with veriﬁcation. These include, grid comput-
ing applications in which jobs have to be executed on machines whose “speed” is only known to the owners [2] (a simpler
version of the scheduling problem in [9] motivating mechanisms with veriﬁcation), BGP routing when Autonomous Systems
(AS) have subjective “per-packet” costs [7] (the routing policy determines the amount of traﬃc that transits through each
AS and packets latency—i.e., the cost for the AS—can be observed).
1.1. Mechanisms with veriﬁcation and one-parameter agents
Nisan and Ronen [9] introduced mechanisms with veriﬁcation in the following scenario. We have a number of jobs and
a number of machines. Each machine i is of some type ti meaning that the execution of a job j on a machine i requires
time t ji . Each machine corresponds to a selﬁsh agent and the type of machine i is only known to agent i. The key idea of
mechanisms with veriﬁcation has been suggested by Nisan and Ronen [9] for this problem: machine i cannot release job j
before t ji time steps. Therefore, if agent i reports a type b
j
i for job j and a job j is assigned to machine i, the mechanism is
able to detect that b ji is not the true type i if b
j
i < t
j
i . If that is the case, and only in this case, the mechanism can penalize
this agent. We apply this simple idea to the case of one-parameter agents studied by Archer and Tardos [2]. Here, each
feasible solution x assigns some amount of work w(x, i) to agent i who, given her type ti , must spend w(x, i) · ti time steps
for completing the given work. Agent i can strategically misreport her type to some other value bi and release the results
of its computations after its completion time (or later). So, agent i is not able to complete her work consistently with her
reported type if and only if w(x, i) · bi < w(x, i) · ti . In this case, we say that agent i is caught lying and the mechanism can
penalize her by denying the corresponding payment. A mechanism with veriﬁcation provides a payment to agent i if and only
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given that agent i reports a type bi and her (true) type is ti . In contrast, mechanisms without veriﬁcation always provide
the payment to agent i. A natural problem involving one-parameter agents is the scheduling on related machines [2]: jobs
have weights and machines have speeds, and an assignment determines the amount of work allocated to each machine. In
Section 2 we provide a formal setting for mechanisms with veriﬁcation in the case of one-parameter agents.
1.2. Overview of the results
One-parameter agents provide a very natural setting for representing subjective preferences when agents receive different
amounts of the same “good” [8]: each agent valuates a single unit some amount ti and her total valuation is this value times
the total amount that she gets. In the scenario proposed by Archer and Tardos [2], goods are actually units of work and
the type of each agent is the amount of time it costs for such an agent to complete one unit of work. Both of these works
show that truthful mechanisms without veriﬁcation are characterized by monotone algorithms [2,8]: intuitively speaking, no
agent receives more work if she increases the reported cost per unit, i.e., reporting bi will cause this agent to get at most
the same amount of work as if reporting any b′i > bi .
We ﬁrst give a characterization of truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation for one-parameter agents in the case of ﬁnite
domains (i.e., there is a ﬁnite set of values that an agent can report). In particular, we show that there is a truthful mech-
anism using some algorithm if and only if the latter is roughly monotone: if an agent receives no work when reporting bi ,
then it also receives no work when reporting any b′i > bi . We stress that the “if part” of our characterization is construc-
tive and that the hypothesis of ﬁnite domains can be easily removed for many “natural” problems. We indeed provide
suﬃcient conditions for obtaining computationally eﬃcient truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation. This result yields a new
mechanism design technique which essentially turns polynomial-time roughly monotone algorithms into polynomial-time
truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation having “roughly” the same approximation guarantee. So, the construction of the entire
mechanism reduces to the construction of a roughly monotone algorithm for the problem at hand. This is an improve-
ment over existing approaches [2,8] since, as mentioned above, the rough monotonicity condition is less stringent than the
monotonicity one. We indeed apply this new approach to a number of problems previously considered in the literature and
obtain improvements over existing mechanisms.
Our ﬁrst application in one of the most studied and intriguing problems in algorithmic mechanism design: scheduling
jobs on selﬁsh machines in order to minimize the makespan [1,2,6,9]. We give the ﬁrst truthful polynomial-time (1 + ε)-
approximation mechanism for any number of related machines having their execution times bounded by some constant, for
every ε > 0. Notice that the mechanism for unrelated machines in [9] also assumes bounded execution times, but works
only for a ﬁnite number of machines. Similarly, the mechanism by Andelman et al. [1], which does not use veriﬁcation,
also requires a constant number of machines. For arbitrary number of machines, the best approximation factor achieved by
a polynomial-time truthful mechanism is 3 which is achieved by Kovács [6], while an exact not polynomial-time truthful
mechanism is given in [2]. Neither mechanism uses veriﬁcation.
We then show that mechanisms with veriﬁcation are provably better than mechanisms without veriﬁcation for several
variants of the above problem considered in the literature. Our upper bounds “break” the inapproximability results for
mechanisms without veriﬁcation. The ﬁrst of these problems is the one in which the objective is to minimize the weighted
sum of all jobs completion times. Archer and Tardos [2] proved that, without veriﬁcation, no truthful mechanism can achieve
an approximation ratio better than 2/
√
3. We instead show that there exists an exact truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation.
Interestingly enough, we prove this result by showing that every exact algorithm for this problem is roughly monotone.
This indicates that roughly monotone algorithms are a “natural” class: exact solutions fulﬁll this requirement but not the
monotonicity one [2]. We obtain analogous results for the problem of scheduling selﬁsh jobs on related “unselﬁsh” machines
studied in [3]. In this case, we have polynomial-time mechanisms with veriﬁcation that obtain an approximation smaller than
the approximation factor of any mechanism without veriﬁcation, even if the latter runs in exponential time. We describe
a simple polynomial-time (1 + ε)-approximation mechanisms with veriﬁcation for this NP-hard problem, for every ε > 0.
Notice that no mechanism without veriﬁcation can attain an approximation factor better than (1 + √17 )/4, no matter its
running time [3].
Finally, in our view, one of the main contribution of this work is on the formal setting describing how veriﬁcation is
used. In particular, the mechanism cannot ﬁne the agents and all it is allowed to do is to deny the payment to an agent that
is caught lying. In order to make this “soft punishment” into a truthful mechanism we use voluntary participation: truthful
agents do not run in a loss. Agents can report any type in a common domain and the type does not give any a priori
information (unlike the mechanisms with “partial veriﬁcation” considered in the classical game theory literature [11]—see
Section 8). The model we propose is also slightly more general than the one in [9] where an agent that artiﬁcially delays
the execution of the assigned job incurs a cost equal to the artiﬁcially delayed time. We discuss these issues more in detail
in Section 8.
Road map. In the following section, we provide a formal setting for mechanism design optimization problems involving
one-parameter agents. Besides giving the necessary notation and deﬁnitions, here we formalize the use of veriﬁcation for
one-parameter agents. In Section 3, we present a startup result for a special case called overbidding agents. We give our
characterization in Section 4 and extend the positive result in Section 5 in order to guarantee computational eﬃciency for
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on other problems showing the power of veriﬁcation for one-parameter agents. In Section 8 we conclude by providing
connections and comparing to existing mechanism design techniques and results. We also present open problems and
outline future research directions.
2. Formal setting
We are given a ﬁnite set ‘Solutions’ of feasible solutions and n selﬁsh agents each of them assigning a monetary valuation
to each solution. This monetary valuation depends on the type ti of the corresponding agent i and is denoted by v(x, ti),
with x ∈ Solutions. For each agent i we have a domain Di consisting of the range of all possible types ti . The type ti is
known to agent i and each agent reports some (possibly different) type bi in the domain Di .
In the case of one-parameter agents, the valuations are all of the form
v(x, ti) = −w(x, i) · ti,
where w(x, i) and ti are nonnegative real numbers. In particular, w(x, i) is the work that solution x assigns to agent i.
An algorithm A receives in input the reported types b = (b1, . . . ,bn) and returns a feasible solution A(b). We sometimes
refer to the reported types as the agents’ bids. Notice that an agent might have an incentive in misreporting her type if this
leads A to return a solution which is better for that agent. For instance, agent i is better off if the work assigned to her
reduces when misreporting her type to bi (given the types reported by the other agents). If agent i receives a payment r
and a solution x is chosen, then her utility is equal to
r + v(x, ti) = r − w(x, i) · ti .
A mechanism is a pair (A, P ) where A is an algorithm as above and P = (P1, . . . , Pn) is a vector of payment functions: Given
the vector b as above, the mechanism computes a feasible solution A(b) and, for each agent i, a payment Pi(b). For ease of
notation, we denote w(A(b), i) simply as wAi (b). Mechanisms without veriﬁcation provide each agent a payment Pi(b) and
thus the corresponding utility is
Pi(b) + v
(
A(b), ti
)= Pi(b) − wAi (b) · ti .
Let b−i denote the vector of types reported by all agents but i, that is,
b−i
def= (b1, . . . ,bi−1,bi+1, . . . ,bn).
Each element in the vector b−i is taken from the domain of the corresponding agent, that is, b−i belongs to the set D−i
def=
D1 ×· · ·×Di−1 ×Di+1 ×· · ·×Dn . We let (γ ,b−i) be the vector (b1, . . . ,bi−1, γ ,bi+1, . . . ,bn). We say that (A, P ) is a truthful
mechanism if truthtelling is a dominant strategy for all agents. That is, for every b and t as above, the following holds:
Pi(ti,b−i) − wAi (ti,b−i) · ti  Pi(b) − wAi (b) · ti .
In a mechanism with veriﬁcation for one-parameter agents, agent i receives the payment Pi(b) if and only if agent i is not
caught lying, that is, the case wAi (b) · bi  wAi (b) · ti . Otherwise, for wAi (b) · bi < wAi (b) · ti , agent i is caught lying and she
does not receive any payment. So, the payment received by agent i in a mechanism with veriﬁcation (A, P ) is a function of
her own type ti and of the reported types b:
Pveri (b|ti) def=
{
Pi(b) if wAi (b) · bi  wAi (b) · ti (not caught lying),
0 if wAi (b) · bi < wAi (b) · ti (caught lying).
The deﬁnition of truthful mechanism extends naturally to mechanisms with veriﬁcation. In particular, we say that (A, P ) is
a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation for one-parameter agents if the inequality
Pveri (ti,b−i |ti) − wAi (ti,b−i) · ti  Pveri (b|ti) − wAi (b) · ti
holds for all i, for all ti,bi ∈ Di and for all b−i ∈ D−i . Observe that, since wAi (b)  0 for all b, the condition “wAi (b) · bi 
wAi (b) · ti” is equivalent to “wAi (b) = 0 or bi  ti .” By simple substitution we get an equivalent condition for being truthful
with veriﬁcation:
Theorem 1. A pair (A, P ) is a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation for one-parameter agents if and only if for all i, for all ti,bi ∈ Di
and for all b−i ∈ D−i , it holds that
Pi(ti,b−i) − wAi (ti,b−i) · ti  Pi(b) − wAi (b) · ti (not caught lying)
for wAi (b) = 0 or bi  ti , and
Pi(ti,b−i) − wAi (ti,b−i) · ti −wAi (b) · ti (caught lying)
for wA(b) > 0 and bi < ti .i
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is, Pi(ti,b−i) wAi (ti,b−i) · ti , for all i, for all b−i ∈ D−i , and for all ti ∈ Di . We say that a mechanism uses an algorithm A
if the mechanism is a pair (A, P ), for some P as above. An algorithm A admits a truthful mechanism (with veriﬁcation) if
there exists a truthful mechanism (with veriﬁcation) that uses algorithm A.
We consider mechanisms for optimization problems involving one-parameter agents meaning that every problem instance
is a pair (t,π), where t is the private part and π is the public part of the instance. The private part t is the vector t =
(t1, . . . , tn) of the true agents’ types. The set of feasible solutions of an instance (t,π) depends uniquely on its public part π ,
and it is denoted by Solutions(π). The measure of a solution x ∈ Solutions(π) with respect to the instance (t,π) depends
on both t and π and it is denoted by Measure(x, t,π). For minimization problems, the goal is to ﬁnd a feasible solution
for a given instance which minimizes the corresponding measure. An exact algorithm for a minimization problem, on input
an instance (t,π), returns a feasible x such that Measure(x, t,π) = miny∈Solutions(π) Measure(y, t,π). (For maximization
problems, the condition is the same but with ‘max’ in place of ‘min’.) A c-approximation algorithm for a minimization
problem, on input (t,π), returns a feasible solution x such that Measure(x, t,π) c ·miny∈Solutions(π) Measure(y, t,π). Such
an x is a c-approximate solution for (t,π). (For maximization problems, the condition is the same but with ‘’ and ‘c’
replaced by ‘’ and ‘1/c,’ respectively.) Following the standard deﬁnitions used in the literature, an optimization problem
is a quadruple
(Instances,Measure,Solutions,Goal),
where Goal = ‘min ’ for minimization problems, and Goal = ‘max ’ for maximization problems. An optimization problem
involving one-parameter agents is an optimization problem in which Instances = D × Public, where Public contains all
possible public parts π of an instance and D
def= D1×· · ·×Dn is the domain of all one-parameter agents. Hence, if (t,π) is an
instance of the problem, then every (b,π) with b ∈ D is also an instance of the problem. A mechanism for an optimization
problem receives in input an instance (b,π), where b = (b1, . . . ,bn) is a vector of types reported by the agents whose types
are (t1, . . . , tn). So, the mechanism computes a feasible solution A(b, σ ) ∈ Solutions(σ ) and, for each agent i, a payment
Pi(b, σ ). An optimization problem admits a truthful mechanism if, for every π ∈ Public, there exists a truthful mechanism
(A(π), P (π)) such that A(π)(b) ∈ Solutions(π) for all b ∈ D . In this case, we say that (A, P ) is a truthful mechanism for this
optimization problem if A(b,π) = A(π)(b) and Pi(b,π) = P (π)i (b), for all b ∈ D and for all i. Such a mechanism satisﬁes
the voluntary participation if all mechanisms (A(π), P (π)) satisfy the voluntary participation. The mechanism (A, P ) is a
c-approximation mechanism if A is a c-approximation algorithm. Algorithm A is a polynomial-time algorithm if its running
time is polynomial in the input (b,π), for every b ∈ D and π ∈ Public. Similarly, the payment functions P = (P1, . . . , Pn) are
polynomial-time if each Pi is computable in time polynomial in the size of (b,π), for b ∈ D and π ∈ Public. A mechanism
(A, P ) for an optimization problem is polynomial-time if both A and P are polynomial-time. I.e., the mechanism returns the
solution and the payments in time polynomial in the size of the input. For ﬁnite domains D , each b requires O (n log |D|)
bits, and thus polynomial running time means time polynomial in O (n log |D|) and in the size of π . For inﬁnite domains, we
allow agents to specify bids of arbitrary bit-length (i.e., rational numbers of arbitrary precision). In this case, the size of b
(in number of bits using the standard encoding) is Ω(max{n, log(bmax/bmin)}), where bmax and bmin are the largest and the
smallest element in b. So, polynomial running time is meant as polynomial in the size of b and in the size of π .
Remark 2. Throughout the paper we specify properties/conditions/deﬁnitions for algorithms A taking in input a bid vector b.
We extend all of such properties/conditions/deﬁnitions to algorithms for optimization problems in the natural way. That is,
the corresponding property/condition/deﬁnition needs to hold for every ﬁxed π ∈ Public. We also extend the notation wAi (·)
by letting wAi (b,π)
def= w(A(b,π), i). Again, all properties/conditions/deﬁnitions speciﬁed for wAi (b) extend in the natural
way by requiring them to hold for every ﬁxed π with respect to wA
(π)
i (b)
def= wAi (b,π).
3. Truthful mechanisms for overbidding agents
In this section we consider overbidding agents, that is, the scenario in which no agent can report a type bi which is
smaller than her own type ti . A truthful mechanism for overbidding agents guarantees that, if every agent can only report
bi  ti , with bi ∈ Di , then the utility of each agent i is maximized for bi = ti . As we will see below, these mechanisms
constitute the “building block” for truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation. Overbidding agents have been studied by Singh
and Wittman [11] where, among other results, the authors proved the next theorem below. We give here a proof since
the payments will be used for obtaining mechanisms with veriﬁcation and, to this aim, we will deﬁne payments satisfying
a condition which is slightly stronger than truthfulness (see Remark 4 below).
Theorem3. Every algorithm admits a truthful mechanism for overbidding agents in the case of ﬁnite domains. The obtainedmechanism
also satisﬁes the voluntary participation condition.
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in the case in which every Di is ﬁnite. In order to guarantee that (A, P ) is a truthful mechanism for overbidding agent it
suﬃces to guarantee that, for every b−i ∈ D−i , and for every bi, ti ∈ Di , with bi > ti , the following inequality holds:
Pi(ti,b−i) − wAi (ti,b−i) · ti  Pi(b) − wAi (b) · ti . (1)
Let Di = {d1i , . . . ,di }, where  is the cardinality of Di . Without loss of generality we consider these elements in increasing
order, that is,
d1i < · · · < di .
First, we deﬁne the payment associated to the largest element di in Di :
Pi
(
di ,b−i
) def= wAi (di ,b−i) · di . (2)
Then, starting from this value, we deﬁne the payments for all other elements as follows:
Pi
(
d ji ,b−i
) def= wAi (d ji ,b−i) · d ji +maxk> j
{
Pi
(
dki ,b−i
)}
. (3)
Observe that the value of Pi(d
j
i ,b−i) depends only on the pre-computed values
Pi
(
d j+1i ,b−i
)
, . . . , Pi
(
di ,b−i
)
.
Now observe that, for every ti,bi ∈ Di , with bi > ti , we have ti = d ji and bi = dki , for some 1 j < k . From (3) and from
wAi (d
j
i ,b−i) · d ji  0, we conclude that (1) holds. That is, the mechanism (A, P ) is truthful for overbidding agents. Finally,
the voluntary participation holds because of (2)–(3) and because payments are nonnegative. 
Remark 4. We stress that the mechanism of the above theorem guarantees a stronger version of truthfulness for overbidding
agents. In particular, because of (3), we have that for every ti and for every b such that bi > ti , it holds that Pi(ti,b−i) −
wAi (ti,b−i) · ti  Pi(b). Since wAi (b) · ti  0, this condition implies truthfulness for overbidding agents, that is (1).
4. A characterization
In this section, we characterize the class of truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation for one-parameter agents. As we will
see, this result shows that mechanisms with veriﬁcation require a much less stringent condition on the underlying algo-
rithm, as compared to mechanisms without veriﬁcation [2,8]. Another interesting consequence of this characterization is
that designing truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation is “harder” than designing truthful mechanisms for overbidding agents
(the latter type do not impose any restriction on the algorithm to be used—see Theorem 3). In Section 4.1, we provide a
necessary condition. In Section 4.2, we show that this condition suﬃces for every ﬁnite domain and, more in general, if one
is able to obtain a truthful mechanism for overbidding agents which also satisﬁes the voluntary participation condition (see
Theorem 7). This gives a characterization of truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation for ﬁnite domains (see Corollary 8).
4.1. A necessary condition. . .
In this section we provide a necessary condition for obtaining truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation. In particular, we
will show that, if (A, P ) is a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation, then algorithm A must satisfy the following:
Deﬁnition 5 (Roughly monotone algorithm). An algorithm A is roughly monotone if, for all b ∈ D and for all i, the following
holds. If wAi (b) = 0 then wAi (b′i,b−i) = 0 for all b′i > bi with b′i ∈ Di .
For scheduling problems, roughly monotone algorithms satisfy the following natural condition. If the algorithm does not
use machine i, then the algorithm does not use machine i if this machine becomes slower (provided the speeds of the other
machines do not change).
Theorem 6. Every truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation must use a roughly monotone algorithm.
Proof. We show that, if (A, P ) is a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation, then A is roughly monotone. We proceed by way
of contradiction and assume that algorithm A is not roughly monotone. Therefore, there exists a d ∈ D and an i which
violate the condition in Deﬁnition 5. That is, wAi (d) = 0 and wAi (d′i,d−i) > 0, for some d′i > di , with d′i ∈ Di .
Since (A, P ) is a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation, we can apply Theorem 1 with ti = di , bi = d′i , and b−i = d−i . By
deﬁnition, we have that bi > ti and thus Theorem 1 (not caught lying) implies
Pi(d) − wA(d) · di  Pi
(
d′,d−i
)− wA(d′,d−i) · di . (4)i i i i
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implies
Pi
(
d′i,d−i
)− wAi (d′i,d−i) · d′i  Pi(d) − wAi (d) · d′i . (5)
Since wi(b) = wi(d) = 0, by summing up (4) with (5) we get
−wAi
(
d′i,d−i
) · d′i −wAi (d′i,d−i) · di .
Since wAi (d
′
i,d−i) > 0 we have d
′
i  di , thus contradicting the hypothesis d′i > di . 
4.2. . . .and its suﬃciency
In this section we show that the necessary condition given in the previous section (i.e., roughly monotone algorithms)
suﬃces for obtaining truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation, provided that we can guarantee the voluntary participation
condition. Intuitively speaking, for roughly monotone algorithms, the construction of truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation
“reduces” to the construction of a truthful mechanism for overbidding agents satisfying the voluntary participation. We
stress that we do not make any assumption on the domain.
Theorem 7. Every roughly monotone algorithm that admits a truthful mechanism for overbidding agents satisfying the voluntary
participation also admits a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation. The latter mechanism satisﬁes the voluntary participation as well.
Proof. Let A be roughly monotone and let (A, P ) be a truthful mechanism for overbidding agents that also satisﬁes the
voluntary participation (this mechanism exists because of Theorem 3). We ﬁrst modify the payment function so that only
the agents that receive a strictly positive work are assigned some payment. Consider the following payments:
P ′i(b)
def=
{
0 if wAi (b) = 0,
Pi(b) otherwise.
(6)
We ﬁrst show that, since A is roughly monotone, then the new payments specify a mechanism (A, P ′) which is also
truthful for overbidding agents and satisﬁes the voluntary participation. That is, for every i, b−i , ti , and bi > ti , the following
inequality holds:
P ′i(ti,b−i) − wAi (ti,b−i) · ti  P ′i(b) − wAi (b) · ti . (7)
If wAi (ti,b−i) = 0, then the fact that A is roughly monotone implies wAi (b) = 0. This and (6) imply that P ′i(ti,b−i) = 0 =
P ′i(b), and thus the above inequality holds. If w
A
i (ti,b−i) > 0 and w
A
i (b) > 0, then we simply observe that P
′
i(ti,b−i) =
Pi(ti,b−i) and P ′i(b) = Pi(b). In this case, (7) follows from the fact that (A, P ) is truthful for overbidding agents. Finally,
we consider the case wAi (ti,b−i) > 0 and w
A
i (b) = 0. Since (A, P ) satisﬁes the voluntary participation, we have Pi(ti,b−i)
wAi (ti,b−i) · ti . Moreover, from (6), we have P ′i(ti,b−i) = Pi(ti,b−i) and P ′i(b) = 0. So, the right-hand side of (7) is equal
to 0, and the inequality follows from Pi(ti,b−i)  wAi (ti,b−i) · ti . The voluntary participation of (A, P ′) follows from the
observation that the only case in which P ′i(ti,b−i) = Pi(ti,b−i) is for wAi (ti,b−i) = 0, in which case we have P ′i(ti,b−i) =
0 = wAi (ti,b−i) · ti . Otherwise, for wAi (ti,b−i) > 0, the voluntary participation of (A, P ) implies P ′i(ti,b−i) = Pi(ti,b−i) 
wAi (ti,b−i) · ti .
We next show that (A, P ′) is a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation. We distinguish the two cases in Theorem 1:
i is not caught lying. For bi  ti , since (A, P ′) is truthful for overbidding agents, we have
P ′i(ti,b−i) − wAi (ti,b−i) · ti  P ′i(b) − wAi (b) · ti .
For bi < ti , it must be wAi (b) = 0, since otherwise i is caught lying. Since A is roughly monotone, we have
wAi (ti,b−i) = 0. From (6) we have P ′i(b) = P ′i(ti,b−i) = 0, thus implying that the above inequality holds also in this
case.
i is caught lying. In this case we have wAi (b) > 0 and bi < ti . We need to show that the inequality in Theorem 1 (caught
lying) holds. Since (A, P ′) satisﬁes the voluntary participation, and since wAi (b) 0 for all b, we have
Pi(ti,b−i) − wAi (ti,b−i) · ti  0−wAi (b).
From Theorem 1 we conclude that (A, P ′) is a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation.
Finally, (A, P ′) is a mechanism with veriﬁcation satisfying the voluntary participation. Indeed, we simply observe that, on
input (ti,b−i), the mechanism with veriﬁcation (A, P ′) awards agent i a payment Pveri (ti,b−i |ti) = P ′i(ti,b−i) wi(ti,b−i) ·ti ,
where the inequality has been proved above when considering the pair (A, P ′) as a mechanism for overbidding agents
(satisfying the voluntary participation). 
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of ﬁnite domains:
Corollary 8. In the case of ﬁnite domains, an algorithm admits a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation if and only if it is roughly
monotone.
We note that the “if part” of the above theorem does not require ﬁnite domains in general. Indeed, in Section 5.2 we
will relax this assumption and provide mechanisms for inﬁnite domains.
5. Computational eﬃciency and approximation
We start observing that the payments of Theorem 7 (see Eq. (6)) are essentially the payments of the mechanism for
overbidding agents. Hence, we can extend the result of Theorem 7 to guarantee polynomial running time:
Corollary 9. Every roughly monotone algorithm that admits a polynomial-time truthful mechanism for overbidding agents satisfying
the voluntary participation also admits a polynomial-time truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation. The latter mechanism satisﬁes the
voluntary participation as well.
Notice that the above result is very general since we make no assumption on the agents domains. In the sequel
we will derive computationally eﬃcient mechanisms with veriﬁcation by constructing computationally eﬃcient truthful
mechanisms for overbidding agents. Observe that Theorem 3 says that, for ﬁnite domains, there always exists a truthful
mechanism for overbidding agents satisfying the voluntary participation. However, a direct use of this theorem does not
yield a polynomial-time mechanism. In particular, the time to compute each payment function Pi(·) is Ω(|Di |), which in
general is not polynomial in the size of the input (b,π).
In Section 5.1, we provide a technique for computing the payments eﬃciently for ﬁnite domains. The idea is to round the
agents’ bids, while preserving approximability and truthfulness. In Section 5.2, we extend this approach to inﬁnite domains
by considering algorithms which ignore bids that are “too large.”
5.1. First, ﬁnite domains eﬃciently. . .
In this section we describe a class of optimization problems for which rounding the input bids has only a small impact
on the quality of the solution produced by the algorithm. In this case, for any algorithm A we construct an algorithm Aˆ that
simply works on the rounded bids. In this way, the payments computation needs to consider only a subset of the domain
(i.e., the possible rounded bids) and can be thus performed in polynomial time. In doing so, we only lose an “arbitrary small”
factor in the approximation guarantee of the original algorithm A.
Let us now proceed formally.
Deﬁnition 10. An optimization problem is smooth if, for every ε > 0, there exists γ = γ (ε) such that, for every t′, t′′ ∈ D
with maxi{t′i/t′′i , t′′i /t′i}  γ , the following holds. Every c-approximate solution for the instance (t′,π) is also a c(1 + ε)-
approximate solution for the instance (t′′,π), for every π ∈ Public.
Now a natural approach suggests itself. We round each agent reported type bi to the closest power of γ = γ (ε). In
particular, for any c-approximation algorithm A, the algorithm Aˆ which consists of running A on the rounded types is a
c(1+ ε)-approximation algorithm. Moreover, the number of possible values for each agent type is logarithmic in the size of
the domain Di . Then, a mechanism ( Aˆ, P ) which is truthful for these rounded types is also computationally eﬃcient.
Theorem 11. In the case of ﬁnite domains, every polynomial-time roughly monotone c-approximation algorithm for a smooth problem
admits a polynomial-time c(1+ε)-approximation truthful mechanismwith veriﬁcation, for every ε > 0. In particular, both the solution
and the payments can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the input. Moreover, the mechanism satisﬁes the voluntary
participation.
Proof. Let A be any algorithm satisfying the hypothesis of the theorem. We start by rounding the bids up to the closest
power of γ = γ (ε) and give these rounded values in input to A. Since the problem is smooth, this deﬁnes a polynomial-
time roughly monotone c(1+ ε)-approximation algorithm Aˆ. From Corollary 9, it suﬃces to show that algorithm Aˆ admits
a polynomial-time (1+ ε)-approximation mechanism for overbidding agents and that the mechanism satisﬁes the voluntary
participation. We prove the latter result in two steps. We ﬁrst deﬁne a mechanism for a domain containing all possible
powers of γ , and then extend the mechanism to the original domain.
For every x, we let up(x) be the value obtained by rounding x up to the smallest integer power of γ , that is,
up(x)
def= min{γ p ∣∣ γ p  x, p ∈ Z}.
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(A, P ) is a truthful mechanism for overbidding agents with domain up(D). To this end, for every i, we let
Dˆi
def= up(Di)
and Dˆ
def= Dˆ1 × · · · × Dˆn = up(D). Let P be the payment function of Theorem 3 relatively to the domain Dˆ only. Recall that
the mechanism (A, P ) satisﬁes the following condition (see Remark 4):
Pi(tˆi, bˆ−i) − wAi (tˆi, bˆ−i) · tˆi  Pi(bˆ), (8)
for all bˆ−i ∈ Dˆ−i and tˆi, bˆi ∈ Dˆi , with bˆi > tˆi . We now prove that the natural extension
Aˆ(·) def= A(up(·)) and Pˆ i(·) def= Pi(up(·)) (9)
of the mechanism (A, P ) is truthful for overbidding agents with respect to the original domain D . In particular, for any i,
b−i ∈ D−i , and any ti,bi ∈ Di , with bi > ti , we let tˆi = up(ti), bˆi = up(bi), bˆ−i = up(b−i). Observe that bˆi  tˆi and that we
only need to consider the case bˆi > tˆi , since for bˆi = tˆi the mechanism outputs the some solution and the same payment.
Then, observe that
Pˆ i(ti,b−i) − w Aˆi (ti,b−i) · ti =
(
from (9)
)
(10)
Pi(tˆi, bˆ−i) − wAi (tˆi, bˆ−i) · ti 
(
from tˆi  ti and wAi (·) 0
)
(11)
Pi(tˆi, bˆ−i) − wAi (tˆi, bˆ−i) · tˆi 
(
from (8) and from bˆ = up(b)) (12)
Pi(bˆ) =
(
from (9)
)
(13)
Pˆ i(b)
(
from w Aˆi (·) 0 and ti  0
)
(14)
Pˆ i(b) − w Aˆi (b) · ti . (15)
Also notice that, since the payments P of Theorem 3 are always nonnegative, then the voluntary participation follows
from (10)–(13). 
5.2. . . .then, inﬁnite domains eﬃciently too
In this section, we provide constructions of computationally eﬃcient mechanisms for inﬁnite domains, that is, we assume
bids to be any strictly positive real number. Notice that our construction applies to any domain in which all bids are strictly
positive reals. In particular, the size of the domain can be inﬁnite.
The idea is to consider algorithms for which “too high” bids can be ignored in the sense that the corresponding agent
will be assigned no work. For instance, in the Q ‖ Cmax problem, optimal solutions do not allocate any job to a machine
(agent) if its speed is “much worse” than the speed of any other machine.
Deﬁnition 12 (Bounded algorithm). A roughly monotone algorithm A is bounded if for all b and for all i, there exists Bi =
Bi(b−i) such that wAi (b
′
i,b−i) = 0, for all b′i  Bi . A bounded algorithm is polynomially-bounded if Bi is polynomial in n and
in max j,k{b j/bk}, for all b and for all i.
Intuitively speaking, bounded algorithms allow us to “reduce” the case of inﬁnite domains to the case of ﬁnite domains
studied in the previous section. First, we “discretize” the domain by considering rounded bids (as in Section 5.1). Then,
we build the payments by considering the “semi-ﬁnite” domain consisting of the rounded bids up to Bi . The fact that the
algorithm is polynomially-bounded will imply that these payments can be computed in polynomial time, if the algorithm
runs in polynomial time. Formally, we have the following result extending Theorem 11:
Theorem 13. Every polynomial-time polynomially-bounded c-approximation algorithm for a smooth problem admits a polynomial-
time c(1+ ε)-approximation truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation, for every ε > 0. In particular, both the solution and the payments
can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the input. Moreover, the mechanism satisﬁes the voluntary participation.
Proof. The proof essentially combines the ideas used in the proofs of Theorems 3 and 11. We start by rounding the bids
to the closest power of γ = γ (ε) in input a c-approximation algorithm A, and obtain in this way a c(1+ ε)-approximation
algorithm Aˆ. Then, we build our payment functions upon a “discretized” domain Dˆ consisting of all rounded bids. As we
will see, these payment functions Pi can be extended in the natural way and lead to a truthful mechanism for the inﬁnite
domain.
For every x> 0, we let up(x) be the value obtained by rounding x up to the smallest integer power of γ = γ (ε), that is,
up(x)
def= min{γ p ∣∣ γ p  x, p ∈ Z}.
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def= A(up(·)) is a polynomial-time c(1 + ε)-approximation algorithm. From Corollary 9 it is
suﬃcient to construct a polynomial-time mechanism ( Aˆ, Pˆ ) which is truthful for overbidding agents satisfying the voluntary
participation.
We ﬁrst consider the rounded domain Dˆ
def= up(D). Let Dˆi def= up(Di) and Bˆ i def= Bi(bˆ−i). In order to guarantee truthfulness
w.r.t. the inﬁnite domain, we require a condition which is slightly stronger than truthfulness for overbidding agents (essen-
tially the same as in Remark 4). The condition is that, for every bˆ−i ∈ Dˆ−i = up(D−i), for every tˆi, bˆi ∈ Dˆi with bˆi > tˆi , the
following inequality holds:
Pi(tˆi, bˆ−i) − wAi (tˆi, bˆ−i) · tˆi  Pi(bˆ). (16)
Consider an arbitrary bˆ−i ∈ Dˆ−i and dˆi ∈ Dˆi and let us deﬁne the corresponding payment Pi(dˆi, bˆ−i) as follows. If dˆi  Bˆ i =
Bi(bˆ−i), then we let
Pi(dˆi, bˆ−i)
def= wAi (Bˆ i, bˆ−i) · Bˆ i = 0, (17)
where the second inequality follows from the deﬁnition of Bˆ i . Otherwise, for every dˆi < Bˆ i , we deﬁne the payment recur-
sively:
Pi(dˆi, bˆ−i)
def= wAi (dˆi, bˆ−i) · dˆi + max
bˆi∈Dˆi , dˆi<bˆiBˆ i
{
Pi(bˆi, bˆ−i)
}
. (18)
The crucial observation here is that, in the above equation, the payments for dˆi depend only on the payments for bˆi > dˆi
and that these are ﬁnitely many. Indeed, since di > 0, we have that dˆi = γ p , for some integer p. Hence, the set of all bˆi > dˆi
in Dˆi is ﬁnite and consists of the following elements (notice that γ > 1 because of Deﬁnition 10):
γ p+1 = dˆi · γ < di · γ 2 < · · · < dˆi · γ  = Bˆ i
with γ  = Bˆ i/dˆi . From (18) it follows that the time to compute the payment Pi(dˆi, bˆ−i) is O (T A · 2), with T A being the
running time of algorithm A (below we will prove that this computation is polynomial-time). Now observe that (16) comes
directly from (17)–(18) and from the fact that wAi (dˆi, bˆ−i) = 0 for all dˆi  Bˆ i .
We now prove that the natural extension
Aˆ(·) def= A(up(·)) and Pˆ i(·) def= Pi(up(·)) (19)
of the mechanism (A, P ) is truthful for overbidding agents with respect to the inﬁnite domain. In particular, for any i, b−i ,
and any ti,bi , with bi > ti , we consider tˆi = up(ti), bˆi = up(bi), and bˆ−i = up(b−i). Observe that we only need to consider
the case bˆi > tˆi , since for bˆi = tˆi the mechanism outputs the some outcome and the same payment. Then, observe that
Pˆ i(ti,b−i) − w Aˆi (ti,b−i) · ti =
(
from (19)
)
(20)
Pi(tˆi, bˆ−i) − wAi (tˆi, bˆ−i) · ti 
(
from tˆi  ti and wAi (·) 0
)
(21)
Pi(tˆi, bˆ−i) − wAi (tˆi, bˆ−i) · tˆi 
(
from (16) and from bˆ = up(b)) (22)
Pi(bˆ) =
(
from (19)
)
(23)
Pˆ i(b)
(
from w Aˆi (·) 0 and ti  0
)
(24)
Pˆ i(b) − w Aˆi (b) · ti . (25)
From (17)–(18) it follows that the payments P are always nonnegative. Then, the voluntary participation follows
from (20)–(23).
This completes the proof. 
Notice that we use polynomially-bounded algorithms to guarantee polynomial running time. However, if we do not
consider computational issues, bounded algorithms guarantee the existence of a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation for
inﬁnite domains:
Corollary 14. Every smooth problem that admits an exact (respectively, c-approximation) bounded algorithm admits a (1 + ε)-
approximation (respectively, c(1 + ε)-approximation) truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation. The mechanism satisﬁes the voluntary
participation.
Throughout this section we have assumed that bids are strictly positive. We can extends all of our results by including
the value ‘0’ in the domain. In this case, it suﬃces that the algorithm satisﬁes the following condition: wAi (bi,b−i) is
constant for all bi in [0, B ′), for some B ′ = B ′(b−i).i i i
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In this section, we apply the constructions of computationally eﬃcient mechanisms given in Section 5.1 to the problem
of scheduling jobs on (selﬁsh) related machines. In particular, we present the ﬁrst truthful polynomial-time (1 + ε)-
approximation mechanism for any number of selﬁsh machines and for every ε > 0.
Theorem 15. For every ε > 0, there exists a polynomial-time (1+ε)-approximation truthful mechanismwith veriﬁcation for Q ‖ Cmax
when machine speeds are bounded by a constant.1 Moreover, the mechanism satisﬁes the voluntary participation.
In order to prove the theorem above, we modify the well-known polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS)2 that
Hochbaum and Shmoys [4] give for the case of identical speeds. This modiﬁcation is necessary in order to consider ma-
chines with different speeds and to guarantee rough monotonicity. We stress that we need to restrict to speeds bounded
by some constant only to guarantee polynomial running time of the modiﬁed PTAS. Theorem 13 (see also Deﬁnition 16
below) implies that every polynomial-time roughly monotone c-approximation algorithm for arbitrary speeds can be turned
into a polynomial-time truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation for arbitrary speeds with “roughly” the same approximation
guarantee.
Let us ﬁrst recall the problem formulation and observe that Theorem 13 can be indeed applied:
Deﬁnition 16 (Problem input and formulation for Q ‖ Cmax). The public part π of the input consists of a vector W =
(W1, . . . ,Wm) of all jobs weights. The private part of the input consists of the vector t = (t1, . . . , tn) of machines pro-
cessing times (equivalently, each machine i has a speed equal to si
def= 1/ti and its completion time, when assigned work wi ,
is wi/si = wi · ti). The feasible solutions consists of all assignments of jobs to machines. For every feasible solution x, the
work w(x, i) assigned to agent i is the sum of the job weights that x assigns to machine i. The optimization function is the
makespan, that is, Measure(x, t,W ) = maxi w(x, i) · ti . Clearly this optimization problem is smooth (see Deﬁnition 10) and
every c-approximation algorithm for it must be polynomially-bounded (see Deﬁnition 12), for every constant c.
In the description of the PTAS we follow a top–down approach and use the same nomenclature of Vazirani [13] describing
the original PTAS in [4]. The modiﬁed PTAS is a family of algorithms Scanε where:
(1) Algorithm Scanε is a (1 + ε)-approximation algorithm for Q ‖ Cmax that uses another algorithm Oracleδ as subroutine
(δ is a suitable parameter depending on ε).
(2) Algorithm Oracleδ receives from Scanε a bound C and attempts to compute a feasible solution of cost at most C ·(1+δ).
This algorithm uses another algorithm Exact as subroutine to compute an optimal assignment for a subset of “large”
jobs and then “completes” this solution by assigning the remaining (“small”) jobs greedily.
(3) Algorithm Exact uses a dynamic-programming approach to compute the optimal assignment of the “large” jobs. Its
running time is polynomial if the different weights of the “large” jobs are a constant number.
In the sequel, we follow this approach and show the properties of each algorithm and how they can be derived from
the corresponding subroutine. Ultimately, we will “reduce” the construction of the entire mechanism to the construction of
a suitable algorithm Exact.
6.1. Algorithm Scanε
In this section we provide an overview of algorithm Scanε . We assume to have a family Oracleδ of polynomial-time algo-
rithms such that, for every δ > 0, on input C > 0 and an instance (t,W ), Oracleδ returns either a scheduling of makespan
at most C · (1 + δ) or fail in which case no assignment of makespan smaller than C exists. We will describe algorithm
Oracleδ in Section 6.2. Algorithm Scanε searches for the smallest integer p for which Oracleδ does not return fail on input
C = (1 + δ)p , where δ = ε/3. (As we will see below, this choice of δ guarantees that Scanε is a (1 + ε)-approximation
algorithm.) Fig. 1 shows the pseudocode of algorithm Scanε .
We next show that if the family Oracle enjoys the following three properties then Scanε is (1 + ε)-approximation
roughly monotone algorithm (each of the three properties need to hold for every instance (t,W ), for every C > 0, and for
every δ > 0):
1 We assume si ∈ [1, R], with R being some constant value. By rescaling, we can easily extend the results to the case speeds are positive numbers in
a range [Min,Max]—see Remark 27 at page 205. Notice also that the lower bound si  1 is necessary since allowing arbitrary small speeds makes the upper
bound R meaningless.
2 A polynomial-time approximation scheme is a family of algorithms such that, for every ε > 0, the family contains a polynomial-time (1 + ε)-
approximation algorithm for the corresponding optimization problem.
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δ ← ε/3;
p ← 0;
if Oracleδ((1+ δ)p, t,W ) = fail then
while Oracleδ((1+ δ)p, t,W ) = fail do p = p + 1;
else
while Oracleδ((1+ δ)p, t,W ) = fail do p = p − 1;
p = p + 1;
return Oracleδ((1+ δ)p, t,W ).
Fig. 1. Algorithm Scanε .
(1) Closeness. If Oracleδ(C, t,W ) = fail then Opt(t,W ) C . If instead
Oracleδ(C,W , s) = fail
then Oracleδ returns a solution of makespan at most C · (1+ δ).
(2) Stability. If x = Oracleδ(C, t,W ) = fail and w(x, i) = 0 then for all bi > ti it holds that Oracleδ(C, (bi, t−i),W ) =
Oracleδ(C, t,W ).
(3) Cost-Monotonicity. If x = Oracleδ(C, t,W ) = fail and w(x, i) = 0 then for all C ′ < C such that x′ = Oracleδ(C ′, t,W ) = fail,
w(x′, i) = 0.
We ﬁrst show that the ﬁrst of the three conditions above (Closeness) guarantees the desired approximation factor for
Scanε . The proof follows closely the one given in [4].
Theorem 17 (Essentially due to [4]). If Oracle satisﬁes the Closeness condition, then Scanε is a (1+ ε)-approximation algorithm.
Proof. Let h be the integer at which Scanε stopped on input (t,W ) and let x be the solution returned. Hence, x =
Oracleδ(C, t,W ), for C = (1+ δ)h , and Oracle	((1+ δ)h−1, t,W ) = fail. The ﬁrst part of the Closeness condition implies
Opt(t,W ) (1+ δ)h−1
while from the second part we obtain
Measure(x, t,W ) (1+ δ)h+1  (1+ δ)2 Opt(t,W ) (1+ ε)Opt(t,W ),
where the last inequality follows from δ = ε/3. 
We next show that the last two conditions (Stability and Cost-Monotonicity) imply that algorithm Scanε is roughly
monotone.
Theorem 18. If Oracle satisﬁes conditions Stability and Cost-Monotonicity then Scanε is roughly monotone.
Proof. Consider any b and b′ = (b′i,b−i) with b′i > bi , and let W be any sequence of job weights. In order to show that
Scanε is roughly monotone, we show that w(x, i) = 0 implies w(x′, i) = 0, where x = Scanε(b,W ) and x′ = Scanε(b′,W ).
To this end, we consider the values C,C ′ > 0 such that
x = Scanε(b,W ) = Oracleδ(C,b,W )
and
x′ = Scanε(b′,W ) = Oracleδ(C ′,b′,W ).
We distinguish three cases:
(C ′ = C .) In this case both x and x′ are solutions computed by algorithm Oracleδ with respect to the same bound C . Since
the family Oracle satisﬁes condition Stability, w(x, i) = 0 implies x = x′ , and thus w(x′, i) = 0.
(C ′ < C .) Since w(x, i) = 0, condition Stability implies
Oracleδ(C,b
′,W ) = Oracleδ(C,b,W ).
We can thus apply condition Cost-Monotonicity with x = Oracleδ(C,b′,W ) = fail and x′ = Oracleδ(C ′,b′,W ) = fail, thus
implying that w(x′, i) = 0.
(C ′ > C .) We show that this case is not possible. In particular, we prove that
Oracleδ(C
′′,b′,W ) = fail
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Oracleδ(C ′′,b′,W ) = fail for both C ′′ = C ′ · (1 + δ)−1 and C ′′ = C ′ · (1 + δ)−2. Condition Closeness implies that
Opt(b′,W )  C ′(1 + δ)−1. Hence, for C ′′  C ′ · (1 + δ)−3, Oracleδ(C ′′,b′,W ) = fail, since otherwise we would have a
solution of makespan at most C ′ · (1+ δ)−2 < C ′ · (1+ δ)−1  Opt(b′,W ). 
6.2. Algorithm Oracle
We describe the family of algorithms Oracle and prove that it satisﬁes the three conditions given in the previous section
(Closeness, Stability, and Cost-Monotonicity). The proof is conditional to certain properties of algorithm Exact, which we
describe in Appendix A.
Algorithm Oracleδ receives in input a bound C and an instance (t,W ). Then, it performs the following steps:
(1) Initialization (Partition jobs into large and small ones). If C < Wmax · tmin then Oracleδ returns fail. Otherwise, Oracleδ
partitions the jobs W into two sets: a set L = {L1, . . . , Ll} of large jobs consisting of all the jobs of weight larger than
δ · C , and a set S = {S1, . . . , Sm−l} of small jobs consisting of all the jobs of weight at most δ · C .
(2) Phase I (Scheduling large jobs optimally). Oracleδ rounds the weight of each large job Lh ∈ L down to L′h computed
as the maximum value δ · C · (1 + δ)p , with p integer, that is not greater than Lh (hence, L′h  Lh). We denote by
L′ = (L′1, . . . , L′l) the sequence of the rounded weights. Oracleδ computes an optimal solution for the jobs L′ using
algorithm Exact (described in Appendix A). If this solution has makespan greater than C (with respect to the rounded
weights) then Oracleδ returns fail. Otherwise, we let x(1) be the assignment for the large jobs produced by Exact and
let Oracleδ continue with the next phase in order to schedule the small jobs.
(3) Phase II (Scheduling small jobs greedily). Small jobs are considered one by one and job Si is assigned to the machine that
minimizes its completion time with respect to the load assigned to it by x(1) and by the allocation of the previous small
jobs. Ties are broken by selecting the machine with better speed and then the one with smaller index. We denote by
x(2) the solution obtained at the end of this phase. If x(2) has makespan greater than C · (1 + δ) (with respect to the
real weights of the jobs) then Oracleδ returns fail. Otherwise, Oracleδ continues with the adjustment phase.
(4) Phase III (Adjustment). In the ﬁnal adjustment phase the algorithm partitions the machines into two sets, slow machines
and fast machines, and then modiﬁes the solution x(2) in order to guarantee that each of the f (C, t,W ) fast machines
receives at least one job. The partition is computed in the following way. For every k, from 1 up to n, we check if it
is possible to assign (exactly) one job to the k fastest machines without exceeding the bound C · (1 + δ). We assume,
without loss of generality, that the number of jobs is at least the number of machines. Let M(k) denote the set of k
fastest machines (ties are broken by selecting the machine with smaller index). Let matching(k) be the assignment in
which the ith smallest job goes to the ith slowest machine in the set M(k) (only the k smallest jobs are assigned, the k
fastest machines receive exactly one job, and the other machines receive no jobs). We deﬁne f (C,W , s) as the largest k
such that matching(k) has makespan at most C · (1+ δ), with respect to the vector t and the k smallest jobs of W only.
The f (C, t,W ) fastest machines are the fast machines and the remaining n − f (C, t,W ) are the slow machines.
We obtain a solution x(3) as follows. Starting with solution x(2) , we simply iterate the following step: Until there is
a fast machine i with no work, we move the job that matching( f (C,t,W )) assigns to i to this machine (notice that this
may leave another fast machine with no work). Since every job is moved at most once, this process ends after at most
m steps.
6.2.1. Proving the Closeness condition
We begin by proving the ﬁrst of the three fundamental conditions that Oracle must satisfy.
Lemma 19. Oracle satisﬁes the Closeness condition.
Proof. Let δ > 0 and observe that Oracleδ returns fail because of one of the following three reasons:
(1) C < Wmax · tmin.
Since the completion time of just the largest job Wmax on any machine is at least Wmax · tmin, we have Opt(t,W ) 
Wmax · tmin > C .
(2) The assignment of the large jobs (with respect to the rounded weights) has makespan greater than C .
Since Exact computes an optimal solution of L′ (the set of rounded large jobs), we have that
Opt(t,W ) Opt(t, L) Opt(t, L′) C,
where the second inequality follows from L′h  Lh , for each job h.
(3) In Phase II, a small job is assigned to a machine causing the completion time of that machine to exceed C · (1+ δ).
Let S j be the ﬁrst small job that causes the makespan to exceed C · (1 + δ) and let i be the machine that receives S j .
Then, before S j is assigned to i, the completion time of i is at least C · (1+ δ)− S j · ti  C · (1+ δ)− S j  C · (1+ δ)− C ·
δ = C . (Recall that ti = 1/si and si ∈ [1, R], thus implying ti  1.) Since i is the machine that minimizes the completion
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makespan at least C , that is, Opt(t,W ) C .
Suppose now that Oracleδ(C, t,W ) does not return fail. Then the cost of x(2) computed at the end of Phase II is at most
C · (1+ δ). We have to show that the cost does not exceed C · (1+ δ) after Phase III, that is, the makespan of x(3) is at most
C · (1+ δ). Simply observe that each of the machines for which an adjustment step has been performed receives (only) the
same job it was assigned by matching( f (C,t,W )) . By deﬁnition of f (C, t,W ), the corresponding completion time is at most
C · (1+ δ). As for the other machines, they are assigned the same set or a subset of the jobs they were assigned in x(2) and
thus their completion time is also at most C · (1+ δ). 
6.2.2. Proving the Cost-Monotonicity condition
In order to prove the Cost-Monotonicity condition, we show that Oracleδ uses all and only the fastest machines. This is
because every solution using more machines than Oracleδ incurs a larger cost:
Lemma 20. Every solution of cost at most C · (1+ δ) assigns a positive work to at most f (C, t,W ) machines, for every instance (t,W )
and for f (C, t,W ) being deﬁned as in Phase III of Oracleδ .
Proof. Let x be a solution that assigns positive work to k > f (C, t,W ) machines. We show that its cost must be more than
C · (1 + δ). Without loss of generality, we can assume that x uses only the k fastest machines (otherwise there is another
solution that does it and whose cost is not larger). Moreover, the cost of x is at least the cost of some assignment y for
the k smallest jobs such that no two jobs go to the same machine: we modify x by removing jobs until each of the k
fastest machines remains with one job and, if the jobs that are left do not contain all of the k smallest jobs, we can swap
a (discarded) small job with another (larger) job without increasing the cost. We conclude by showing that the cost of y
obtained in this way is at least the cost of matching(k) . This is because in any y such that every machine gets at most one
job, we can always swap to jobs Wa and Wb Wa , that are assigned to machines of speeds s(a) and s(b) s(a), without
increasing the makespan. So, the assignment matching(k) can be obtained in this way from y without increasing the cost
of y. We conclude that the cost of x is at least the cost of matching(k) . By deﬁnition of f (C, t,W ) and since k > f (C, t,W ),
the cost of matching(k) is larger than C · (1+ δ), and thus the cost of x is more than C · (1+ δ). 
Notice that the effect of the adjustment phase is to have all fast machines with positive work. The above lemma thus
implies the following:
Lemma 21. If Oracleδ(C, t,W ) = fail then the computed solution assigns a positive work to all and only the f (C, t,W ) fastest
machines, where f (C, t,W ) is deﬁned as in Phase III of Oracleδ .
Proof. Lemma 19 and the Closeness condition imply that the cost of Oracleδ(C, t,W ) is at most C · (1 + δ). Lemma 20
implies that this solution can assign a positive work to at most f (C, t,W ) machines. Moreover, as effect of the adjustment
phase, all of the f (C, t,W ) fastest machines have positive work. 
We are now in a position to prove the following:
Lemma 22. Oracle satisﬁes the Cost-Monotonicity condition.
Proof. Let x = Oracleδ(C, t,W ) = fail and w(x, i) = 0. We have to show that, for every C ′ < C such that x′ =
Oracleδ(C ′, t,W ) = fail, it holds that w(x′, i) = 0. According to Lemma 21, solution x assigns a positive work to all of
the f (C, t,W ) fastest machines and, since w(x, i) = 0, machine i is not among them (i.e., there are at least f (C, t,W ) ma-
chines having a better speed or the same speed but a smaller index). Similarly, solution x′ assigns a positive work only to
the f (C ′, t,W ) fastest machines. By deﬁnition and because of C ′ < C , we have that f (C ′, t,W ) f (C, t,W ). So, machine i
is not among the f (C ′, t,W ) fastest machines and therefore w(x′, i) = 0. 
6.2.3. Proving the Stability condition
We can prove the Stability condition by imposing a similar property (only) on the subroutine Exact used to assign large
jobs.
Deﬁnition 23 (Stable algorithm). An algorithm is stable if, for all t ∈ D and for all i, the following holds. If wAi (t) = 0 then
A(t) = A(bi, t−i), for all bi > ti with bi ∈ Di .
Notice that the above condition strengthen that of roughly monotone algorithm (Deﬁnition 5). We shall prove that
imposing such a stronger condition only on algorithm Exact guarantees rough monotonicity on the “entire” algorithm
Scanε .
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machines (i.e., if a machine receives one job, then every faster machine and every machine with smaller index and same speed does).
Proof. Let (t,W ) be such that w(x, i) = 0 with x = Oracleδ(C, t,W ). We let x(a) be the solution computed by Oracleδ at
the end of the corresponding phase of Oracleδ on input (t,W ). Hence, w(x(3), i) = 0. We prove the theorem by considering
the phases of the algorithm separately and show that the solution computed at the end of each phase does not change on
input ((bi, t−i),W ), for bi > ti :
(1) Phase I. We ﬁrst show that, since w(x(3), i) = 0, then w(x(1), i) = 0. Let e(C, t,W ) be the number of machines that
receive a positive work in x(1) = Exact(C, t,W ). Recall that the cost of x(1) with respect to the rounded weights
is at most C and thus its cost with respect to the original weights is at most C · (1 + δ). Lemma 20 implies that
e(C, t,W ) f (C, t,W ). Since w(x(3), i) = 0, machine i is not among the f (C, t,W ) fastest machines (Lemma 21). Since
Exact assigns positive work to all and only the fastest machines, and these are e(C, t,W ) many, we conclude that
w(x(1), i) = 0.
Finally, since Exact is stable and since w(x(1), i) = 0, we have that Exact(C, (bi, t−i),W ) = Exact(C, t,W ) = x(1) .
(2) Phase II. By the previous argument we know that if w(x(1), i) = 0 then the solution given in Phase I on input b′ is
also x(1) . Moreover, by deﬁnition of greedy allocation, if a job is allocated to a nonempty machine, then there is no
faster machine with no work. We conclude that the assignment x(2) produced at the end of this phase assigns positive
work to the fastest machines. Since its cost is at most C · (1+ δ), with the same argument used in the previous item, we
can show that w(x(3), i) = 0 implies w(x(2), i) = 0. This means that every time a small job is considered in Phase II it is
not assigned to machine i because another machine j has a better completion time or it has the same completion time
and j < i. Obviously, the same happens if machine i becomes slower (i.e., for bi > ti). We conclude that the solution
returned at the and of Phase II on input ((bi, t−i),W ) is x(2) .
(3) Phase III. This phase then starts with the same assignment x(2) for both (t,W ) and ((bi, t−i),W ). We claim that, since
w(x(3), i) = 0, then f (C, t,W ) = f (C, (bi, t−i),W ). Hence, the adjustment is the same for both (t,W ) and ((bi, t−i),W )
and so is the ﬁnal solution, that is, x(3) = Oracleδ(C, (bi, t−i),W ).
We have thus shown that Oracleδ(C, t,W ) = x(3) = Oracleδ(C, (bi, t−i),W ), thus implying that the Stability condition
holds. 
6.3. Focusing on Algorithm Exact (proof of the main theorem)
By putting the results of the previous sections together, we obtain that we only have to focus on algorithm Exact used
to assign large jobs optimally in Phase I of Oracleδ . In particular, the existence of the mechanism simply follows from two
properties of Exact, as stated by the following theorem:
Lemma 25. For every ε > 0, algorithm Scanε is a roughly monotone polynomial-time (1+ ε)-approximation algorithm for Q ‖ Cmax
in the case of bounded speeds if the following two conditions holds:
(1) Algorithm Exact is stable and it assigns positive work to all and only the fastest machines. I.e., if the d fastest machine receives no
work, for some d, then also the d − 1 fastest machine receives no work;
(2) Algorithm Exact runs in polynomial time on the input of Phase I of Oracleδ , where δ = ε/3.
Proof. Lemmas 22 and 24 imply that Oracle satisﬁes the Cost-Monotonicity and the Stability conditions, respectively.
From Theorem 18 we have that Scanε is roughly monotone. Lemma 19 and Theorem 17 imply that Scanε is a (1 + ε)-
approximation algorithm. It remains to show that Scanε runs in polynomial time. Observe that Scanε invokes Oracleδ for
O (logC∗) times, with C∗ being the optimum of the instance (t,W ) in input to Scanε . Since C∗ is polynomial in n,m and
in the largest number in (t,W ), it suﬃces to show that, each time Scanε invokes Oracleδ , the latter runs in polynomial
time. The running time of Phase I is dominated by the running time of algorithm Exact on the input received by Oracleδ ,
which is polynomial by hypothesis. The running time of Phase II is clearly polynomial since jobs are assigned greedily. For
Phase III, we have already observed that it requires at most m adjustment steps. 
We conclude by proving the main result of this section which is the existence of a (1+ ε)-approximation mechanism for
any number of machines in the case of bounded speeds (Theorem 15). In Appendix A, we describe a dynamic-programming
algorithm Exact and show the following:
Lemma 26. Algorithm Exact satisﬁes the two conditions of Lemma 25. In particular, its running time is O (n ·m2k · k) where k is the
number of distinct rounded weights of the large jobs received by Oracleδ , with δ = ε/3. For the case of bounded speeds and for every
ﬁxed ε > 0 it holds that k = O (1).
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We conclude this section by discussing a few extensions of Theorem 15.
Remark 27. We stress that Theorem 15 can be applied to the case in which speeds are in a range [Min,Max], with Min
being a known value, while Max does not need to be known to the mechanism. In this case, the deﬁnition of “small” jobs
in Oracleδ becomes “of weight at most δ · C · Min.” The value of Max affects only the running time of Exact (and thus of
Scanε) since k = O (log1+ε(Max/(ε ·Min))).
Remark 28. It is natural to ask which part (algorithm) needs to be changed (improved) in order to extend the result to
“nonconstant” speeds. The “constant speeds” assumption is used to guarantee that Exact has polynomial running time
and that the “greedy assignment” of the small jobs (Phase II of Oracleδ) introduces only a “small error” (Lemma 19).
Hence, a (1+ ε)-approximation mechanism for “nonconstant” speeds based on the analysis presented here would require a
modiﬁcation of Exact and of Phase II of Oracleδ .
7. The power of veriﬁcation
Nisan and Ronen [9] proved that, for scheduling unrelated machines, there is a mechanism with veriﬁcation whose
approximation ratio is better than the approximation ratio of any truthful mechanism without veriﬁcation.
In this section we show that, even for one-parameter agents, there exist optimization problems for which truthful mecha-
nisms with veriﬁcation can achieve a provably better approximation factor than any truthful mechanism without veriﬁcation.
Archer and Tardos [2] proved the ﬁrst lower bound on the approximation ratio achievable by a (possibly super polynomial)
truthful mechanism without veriﬁcation for a speciﬁc optimization problem involving one-parameter agents. We ﬁrst show
that for the same optimization problem there exist exact truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation. We then show analogous
results for yet another optimization problem considered in [3]. In this case, we show that a polynomial-time mechanism
with veriﬁcation can achieve an approximation factor better than the approximation factor of any mechanism without veri-
ﬁcation, including those not running in polynomial time.
7.1. Weighted sum scheduling
Archer and Tardos [2] considered the well-known Q ‖∑ p jC j scheduling problem in the case of selﬁsh machines. This
optimization problem is a variant of Q ‖ Cmax in which the goal is to minimize the weighted sum of all jobs completion
times.
Deﬁnition 29 (Problem input and formulation for Q ‖ ∑ p jC j ). The public part of the input π consists of a vector W =
(W1, . . . ,Wm) of jobs weights, and a vector p = (p1, . . . , pm) of jobs priorities. The private part of the input, the set of
feasible solutions, and the work assigned to each agent are deﬁned as in the Q ‖ Cmax problem. For every feasible solution x,
we denote the completion time of a job j as C j(x, t,W ). The optimization function is the weighted sum of all jobs comple-
tion times, that is, Measure(x, t,W , p) =∑ j p j · C j(x, t,W ). We assume that each machine executes jobs in nondecreasing
order of
p j
W j
(this is the well-known Smith’s Ratio rule [12]). The Smith’s Ratio rule guarantees that, for every assignment of
jobs to machines, no other internal scheduling policy results in a better weighted sum of jobs completion times [12]. Thus,
a feasible solution x is completely speciﬁed by the assignment of jobs to machines.
This scheduling problem shows the reason why mechanisms with veriﬁcation can achieve an approximation factor that is
provably better than the approximation factor of any mechanism without veriﬁcation. Indeed, the latter mechanisms require
monotone algorithms [2,8], while veriﬁcation allows us to relax this condition and use roughly monotone algorithms (see
Corollaries 8 and 14). Archer and Tardos [2] showed that no monotone algorithm (and thus no truthful mechanism without
veriﬁcation) can achieve an approximation factor better than 2/
√
3. In contrast, we can show that every exact algorithm for
this problem is roughly monotone (and thus a (1+ ε)-approximation can be achieved by mechanisms with veriﬁcation).
Theorem 30. Every exact algorithm for Q ‖∑ p jC j is roughly monotone.
Proof. Let A∗ be any exact algorithm for Q ‖∑ p jC j and denote by A(b) the solution output by A∗ on input (b,W , p), for
arbitrary W and p. We proceed by contradiction and assume that there exist b and b′ = (bi,b−i), with b′i > bi , such that
wAi (b) = 0 and wAi (b′) > 0.
Since bi > b′i and w
A
i (b
′) > 0, we have that
Measure
(
A(b′),b′,W , p
)
>Measure
(
A(b′),b,W , p
)
.
Since A(b) is optimal for (b,W , p), we have that
Measure
(
A(b′),b,W , p
)
Measure
(
A(b),b,W , p
)
.
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Measure
(
A(b),b,W , p
)= Measure(A(b),b′,W , p).
Putting things together we obtain
Measure
(
A(b′),b′,W , p
)
>Measure
(
A(b),b′,W , p
)
,
thus contradicting the optimality of A(b′) = A∗(b′,W , p) for the instance (b′,W , p). 
The above result indicates that roughly monotone algorithms deﬁne a “natural” class since it contains all exact algorithms
for Q ‖∑ p jC j . More importantly, from this result we can easily derive optimal truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation for
Q ‖∑ p jC j , in contrast to the lower bound for mechanisms (without veriﬁcation) in [2].
Corollary 31. For every ε > 0, there exists a (1 + ε)-approximation truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation for Q ‖∑ p jC j . Moreover,
for ﬁnite speeds (i.e., the set of possible machine speeds is ﬁnite) there exists an exact truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation. By contrast,
there is no c-approximation truthful mechanismwithout veriﬁcation for theQ ‖∑ p jC j problem, for every c < 2/√3 [2]. This negative
result holds also for the case of two machines with ﬁnite speeds and mechanisms that do not (necessarily) run in polynomial time.
Proof. For ﬁnite speeds, the domain is ﬁnite and thus Corollary 8 implies the existence of an exact truthful mechanism
with veriﬁcation. The existence of a (1 + ε)-approximation mechanism for the case of arbitrary speeds is obtained from
Corollary 14. Indeed, notice that exact algorithms are bounded since the no optimal solution assigns a job to a machine
if its speed is suﬃciently small. Moreover, the problem is smooth because a “small” change in the processing time of one
machine has only a “small” impact of the jobs completion times. This proves the upper bounds and completes the proof. 
We remark that a “small error” ε is introduced only to guarantee truthfulness for the inﬁnite domain resulting from
arbitrary speeds. Although our mechanism with veriﬁcation does not (necessarily) run in polynomial time, its approximation
factor is better than the approximation factor guaranteed by any truthful mechanism without veriﬁcation, including those
running in exponential time. Actually, this lower bound applies to ﬁnite speeds as well, in which case we obtain exact
truthful mechanisms with veriﬁcation.
In the next section, we will consider another optimization problem for which we can obtain computationally eﬃcient
mechanisms. In particular, we will show that polynomial-time mechanisms with veriﬁcation can achieve an approximation
factor better than any mechanism without veriﬁcation, even allowing exponential running time.
7.2. Scheduling selﬁsh jobs
Consider the case in which jobs represent traﬃc demands and the machines are carriers of different speeds. A natural
goal is to minimize the maximum “congestion,” that is, the makespan (no carrier is “overloaded” and no traﬃc demand is
delayed “too much”). The resulting problem is a sort of “dual” of the Q ‖ Cmax problem with selﬁsh machines in the sense
that we consider selﬁsh jobs instead. So, the speeds are known to the mechanism, while the size (weights) of the jobs are
the private part of the input. Intuitively, each agent prefers the solutions that result is a smaller completion time for her
own job, regardless of the completion time of the other jobs and/or the global cost, i.e., the makespan.
Here we consider a natural scenario in which the mechanism can “observe” the amount of traﬃc sent by each agent.
In particular, an agent whose job has weight Wi = ti can always report a weight bi  ti and then actually submit a job of
weight bi (i.e., send the original traﬃc padded with some fake data). Conversely, if such an agent declares a weight bi < ti ,
then the agent is caught lying since she has to send an amount of traﬃc at least ti (i.e., the agent needs to transmit all of
her traﬃc and cannot split it among several machines). This is a variant of the problem in [3] where the authors consider
mechanisms without veriﬁcation. That is, the case in which the mechanism cannot observe the amount of data the agents
transmit (equivalently, the payments received depend only on the agents bids). For this scenario several lower bounds are
known [3]. We will show that mechanisms with veriﬁcation can break also these lower bounds. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne formally
the problem:
Deﬁnition 32 (Problem input and formulation for selﬁsh jobs). The public part of the input π consists of a vector s = (s1, . . . , sm)
of machine speeds. The private part of the input is a vector W = (W1, . . . ,Wn) of n job weights, one for each agent. Hence,
the type ti of agent i is ti = Wi . The set of feasible solutions consists of all job assignments to machines. In particular, every
solution x assigns a subset x( j) jobs to machine j. Thus, machine j’s completion time is
∑
i∈x( j) ti/s j . Machines execute
jobs in a round-robin fashion and all jobs assigned to the same machine are completed in (roughly) the same amount of
time. Each agent valuates a solution x as −Ci(x, t, s), where Ci(x, t, s) def= ∑k∈x( j) tk/s j is the completion time of job i. The
optimization function is the makespan.
Notice that, unlike the case of one-parameter agents, the valuation of an agent depends also on the types t−i of the other
agents. This crucial aspect of the problem leads us to consider mechanisms that are truthful with respect to Bayesian–Nash
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that all the other agents are truthtelling:
Deﬁnition 33. A mechanism (with veriﬁcation) for selﬁsh jobs is truthful with respect to Nash equilibria (in short, NE-truthful)
if truthtelling is a Nash equilibrium. That is, for all t ∈ D , for all i, and for all bi ∈ Di , it holds that
Pveri (t|ti) − Ci(x, t, s) Pveri (bi, t−i |ti) − Ci(x′, t, s),
where (A, P ) is the mechanism under consideration, x = A(t) and x′ = A(bi, t−i).
Notice that every truthful mechanism is also a NE-truthful mechanism, while the converse does not hold in general. The
reason is that in a truthful mechanism truthtelling is a dominant strategy, that is, the utility of agent i is maximized also
when the other agents are not truthtelling.
In the sequel, we will “reduce” the construction of NE-truthful mechanisms for selﬁsh jobs to the construction of truthful
mechanism for a “related” one-parameter agents problem. Towards this end, we introduce a natural variant of the problem
in which each agent i is only allowed to send up to bi units of traﬃc and, if an agent transmits only ti < bi units, the
resources (time slots) allocated to her are not reallocated to the other agents. The important thing here is that, from the
point of view of agent i, the machine on which her job has been allocated “looks like” being executing her job of size ti
together with other jobs of size b j . This is formally captured by this deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 34. The case of selﬁsh jobs with restricted access is deﬁned as the problem in Deﬁnition 32 with the difference
that the completion time of job i is equal to C¯i(x, t,b, s)
def= ti/s j +∑k∈x(i),k =i bk/s j , where j is the machine to which x
assigns job i and b is the bid vector. The valuation of agent i is equal to −C¯i(x, t,b, s) and thus it does not depend on the
types t−i of the other agents. To distinguish the case of jobs with restricted access from the one in Deﬁnition 32 we denote
the latter also as the case of selﬁsh jobs with unrestricted access.
In the case of unrestricted access, truthful mechanisms are “diﬃcult” to obtain because the valuation of agent i depends
also on the types t−i of the other agents. The variant of selﬁsh jobs with restricted access allows us to circumvent this
problem and makes the valuation of i depending only on her type ti . The following result shows the connection between
the restricted access and the unrestricted access cases:
Theorem 35. Every truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation for selﬁsh jobs with restricted access is a NE-truthful mechanism with veriﬁ-
cation for selﬁsh jobs with unrestricted access.
Proof. Let (A, P ) be a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation for selﬁsh jobs with restricted access. For every t,b ∈ D and for
every i, the mechanism guarantees that
Pveri (ti,b−i |ti) − C¯i(x, t,b, s) Pveri (bi,b−i |ti) − C¯i(x′, t,b, s)
where x = A(ti,b−i) and x′ = A(bi,b−i). In particular, for every t ∈ D , for every i, and for every bi ∈ Di , we have
C¯i(y, t, (bi, t−i), s) = ti/s j +∑k∈y( j),k =i tk/s j = Ci(y, t, s), where y is an arbitrary solution and j is the machine to which y
assigns job i. The above inequality then implies the one in Deﬁnition 33. That is, the same mechanism (A, P ) is NE-truthful
for selﬁsh jobs with unrestricted access. 
In [3] it is proved that, even for two machines, no NE-truthful mechanism can guarantee an approximation better than
1+√17
4 . This, combined with Theorem 35, yields the following result:
Corollary 36. No truthful mechanism without veriﬁcation for scheduling selﬁsh jobs with restricted access can achieve an approxima-
tion factor better than 1+
√
17
4 . This negative result holds also for the case of two machines and for mechanisms that do not (necessarily)
run in polynomial time.
In contrast, we will show that a (1 + ε)-approximation factor can be achieved by polynomial-time mechanisms with
veriﬁcation. We ﬁrst show the following general result:
Theorem 37. Every (polynomial-time) c-approximation algorithm for Q ‖ Cmax can be turned into a (polynomial-time) truthful
c(1+ ε)-approximation mechanism with veriﬁcation for scheduling selﬁsh job with restricted access, for every ε > 0.
Proof. We show that every (polynomial-time) c-approximation algorithm A is “essentially” a polynomially-bounded al-
gorithm for an “equivalent” smooth problem involving one-parameter agents. With the same technique used to prove
Theorem 13, we obtain a polynomial-time c(1 + ε)-approximation mechanism with veriﬁcation ( Aˆ, Pˆ ) for this “equiva-
lent” problem. We modify the payments Pˆ and obtain another mechanism with veriﬁcation ( Aˆ, Qˆ ) which is truthful for
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“work” associated to an agent will be always strictly positive. Strictly speaking, no algorithm can be bounded, but having
a nonzero work ensures a “stronger” veriﬁcation: An underbidding agent is always caught lying and does not receive her
payment.
Since the problem is smooth (a “small” change in the size ti of a job has only a “small” impact on the makespan), we
can round the bids in input to some power of γ = γ (ε) and obtain in this way a c(1 + ε)-approximation algorithm Aˆ. For
every solution x, we deﬁne s(x, i) as the speed of the machine to which x assigns job i. Let us consider w(x, i)
def= 1/s(x, i).
Notice that this deﬁnes a problem with one-parameter agents in which the “work” w(x, i) is in the interval [1/smax,1/smin]
and thus it is always strictly positive. Without loss of generality, we can assume that our algorithm A assigns a job i to the
fastest machine as soon as the input b satisﬁes bi 
∑
k =i bk (otherwise we can swap the assignment of the fastest with
that of the machine containing job i without increasing the cost). Therefore, when considering the rounded input bˆ, we
have that w Aˆi (b
′
i,b−i) = wmin def= 1/smax for all b′i  Bi(bˆ−i) def= γ
∑
k =i bˆk . We observe that this condition suﬃces to apply
the construction of the payments in the proof of Theorem 13. In particular, the same arguments show that the resulting
payments Pˆ guarantee truthfulness for overbidding agents if we restrict the bids to the interval (0, Bi(bˆ−i)]. More precisely,
for every b−i , for every ti  Bi(bˆi), and for every bi  Bi(bˆ−i) with bi > ti , the following inequality can be guaranteed:
Pˆ i(ti,b−i) − w Aˆi (ti,b−i) · ti  Pˆ i(b). (26)
The only difference with the proof of Theorem 13 is that this inequality cannot be extended to bi > Bi(bˆ−i) since now
we have w Aˆi (bi,b−i) = wmin > 0. So, using the same arguments of that proof, we impose (16) only for rounded bids in
(0, Bi(bˆ−i)] and obtain that the above inequality holds for bi and ti in (0, Bi(bˆ−i)]. We extend these payments to arbitrary
bids in the natural way, that is, by setting Pˆ i(b′i,b−i) = Pˆ i(Bi(bˆ−i),b−i) for all b′i > Bi(bˆ−i).
Now we go back to the problem of scheduling selﬁsh jobs and deﬁne the following payments:
Qˆ i(b)
def= Pˆ i(b) +
∑
k∈x(i),k =i
w Aˆi (b) · bk.
We show that the resulting mechanism ( Aˆ, Qˆ ) is a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation for scheduling selﬁsh jobs with
restricted access. The key observation is that, if agent i is not caught lying for bids b, then a solution x = Aˆ(b) is computed
and her utility is equal to
Qˆ (b) − C¯i
(
Aˆ(b), t,b, s
)= Qˆ (b) − ti/s( Aˆ(b), i)− ∑
k∈x(i),k =i
bk/s
(
Aˆ(b), i
)
(27)
= Qˆ (b) − w Aˆi (b) · ti −
∑
k∈x(i),k =i
w Aˆi (b) · bk (28)
= Pˆ (b) − w Aˆi (b) · ti . (29)
In particular, the utility of agent i when reporting any bi  ti with bi  Bi(bˆ−i) is equal to
Pˆ i
(
Bi(bˆ−i),b−i
)− wmin · ti .
Moreover, if agent i reports any bi < ti , then she is caught lying and receives no payment. In this case the utility is equal to
−ti/s
(
Aˆ(b), i
)
−ti/smin = −wmin · ti .
Since the payments are nonnegative, this shows that underbidding is never the best strategy for agent i and that we can
restrict the analysis to the case ti < bi  Bi(bˆ−i). Here we can simply apply (26) and obtain
Pˆ i(ti,b−i) − w Aˆi (ti,b−i) · ti  Pˆ i(b) > Pˆ i(b) − w Aˆi (b).
Notice that the left and the right-hand side is the utility of agent i when reporting ti and bi , respectively. We conclude that
( Aˆ, Qˆ ) is a truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation for scheduling selﬁsh jobs with restricted access. If the algorithm A is runs
in polynomial time, then the payments Pˆ can be computed in polynomial time. 
The existence of a PTAS for Q ‖ Cmax [4] and the theorem above imply the following result which provides a sharp
contrast between mechanisms with veriﬁcation and mechanisms without veriﬁcation (Corollary 36).
Corollary 38. There exists a polynomial-time (1 + ε)-approximation truthful mechanism with veriﬁcation for scheduling selﬁsh jobs
with restricted access, for every ε > 0.
The same results can be transposed to the case of selﬁsh jobs with unrestricted access, studied in [3], by considering
NE-truthful mechanisms.
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jobs with unrestricted access, for every ε > 0. By contrast, no NE-truthful mechanism without veriﬁcation can achieve an approxi-
mation factor better than 1+
√
17
4 [3]. This negative result holds also for the case of two machines and for mechanisms that do not
(necessarily) run in polynomial time.
8. Conclusions and open questions
In this work we initiate the study of mechanisms with veriﬁcation for one-parameter agents. We give an algorithmic char-
acterization of such mechanisms and show that they are provably better than mechanisms without veriﬁcation for a number
of optimization problems motivated by the Internet and recently studied in the algorithmic mechanism design literature.
The characterization can be regarded as an alternative approach to existing techniques to design truthful mechanisms. The
construction of a (computationally eﬃcient) mechanism reduces to the construction of a (computationally eﬃcient) roughly
monotone algorithm which satisﬁes a few more “natural” conditions (see Theorem 13).
The results presented in this paper relates to a number of works in (algorithmic) game theory. Mechanisms with “partial
veriﬁcation” have been studied by Singh and Wittman [11]. Their model implicitly assumes that veriﬁcation is done “a priori”
and the type of the agent automatically restricts the possible “lies” that she could tell the mechanism. More precisely,
an agent of type ti is restricted to report a type in a subset R(ti) of the domain, for some function R(·). The natural
application of this model to scheduling problems would be to say that an agent could only report a “worse” type, that is,
a higher cost per unit of work. This is precisely the case of overbidding agents, which we consider in Section 3, that is
R(ti) = {bi ∈ Di | bi  ti}. The characterization that we obtain in Section 4 shows that the model in [11] does not capture the
fact that no veriﬁcation is possible if an agent gets no work.
There is also an interesting difference between our model and the formal setting given in [9] for unrelated machines. In
order to understand this difference, consider the scenario in which the “principal” (mechanism) assign certain amount of
work each “worker” (agent). In the Nisan and Ronen setting, workers will “suffer” the amount of time they have to sit on
their desk pretending that they are doing the assigned work (i.e., until they communicate to the principal that work has
been done along with the results). In our setting, instead, a worker “suffers” as the amount of time that it really takes to
her to complete the work. Pretending a longer time will not cost more as the “idle” time could be used for other activities
(e.g., if the worker is doing her job at home). We feel this as an important difference to consider in future research since
computing facilities are better modeled by the latter scenario (CPU idle time is of no cost and/or can be reused for other
purposes, as well as other unused resources). Also, truthful mechanisms for our setting are also truthful in the other one
(i.e., when the cost for an agent is exactly the completion time of the given work).
Our results suggest a number of questions which are still open. First of all, it would be interesting to extend the main
positive result to more general domains. It is also open the existence of a polynomial-time (1+ε)-approximation mechanism
without veriﬁcation for the makespan in the case of arbitrary number of machines. The question is whether veriﬁcation
helps for related machines. Can we extend our result on this problem to the case of speeds not bounded by a constant?
More generally, what is the best approximation ratio of a computationally eﬃcient mechanism for a given problem? Does
veriﬁcation help in ﬁnding computationally eﬃcient mechanisms with better approximation? Noticeably, existing lower
bounds do not use computational assumptions (i.e., P = NP). For the problem of minimizing the jobs weighted completion
time, one would like to be able to achieve provably better approximations in polynomial time, as we do already for the
case of selﬁsh jobs. The study of approximation classes for optimization problems involving selﬁsh agents is certainly an
interesting topic. This relates to two important aspects like the agents domains and to the possibility of using veriﬁcation
(for one-parameter agents, whether the algorithm has to be only roughly monotone or monotone).
Appendix A. Dynamic programming EXACT algorithm
In this appendix we describe a simple dynamic-programming algorithm Exact and prove Lemma 26. This algorithm
receives in input a set W = {W1, . . . ,Wm} of m jobs, n machines of processing times t = (t1, . . . , tn) and a bound C . We
let k be the number of distinct weights for the jobs in W and consider the set {V1, . . . , Vk} of such weights. Algorithm
Exact checks in time O (n ·m2k ·k) whether there exists an assignment of makespan at most C . If such an assignment exists,
then it returns the “lexicographically minimal” one to ensure that all and only the fastest machines receive positive work
(see item (1) in Lemma 25). Otherwise, it simply returns another assignment whose cost is larger than C . We shell see
that k is bounded by some constant when the set of jobs is the one provided by Oracleδ , thus proving Lemma 26.
Deﬁnition 40. We denote every subset S of W as a k-tuple s = (s(1), . . . , s(k)) where s(h) is the number of jobs in S whose
weight is Vh . For every subset R of S , we denote the set S \ R by s− r def= (s(1) − r(1), . . . , s(k) − r(k)). For 0 d  n − 1 and
for any s as above, we deﬁne Bins(C, s, t,d) to take value 0 if there exists a solution of cost at most C for the set of jobs s
that assigns no work to the d slowest machines (according to the processing times t = (t1, . . . , tn)). If such a scheduling
does not exist, then Bins(C, s, t,d) equals to 1. Finally, we let Store(C, s, t,d) denote the set of tuples r such that R ⊆ S and
the d + 1 slowest machine can complete all jobs in R in time at most C .
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Bins(C,w, t,0) = 0.
To compute this value observe that Bins(C, s, t,n − 1) = 0 if and only if it is possible to execute all jobs in s on the fastest
machine in time not greater than C (we assign no work to the n − 1 slowest machines). Instead, for d < n we have
Bins(C, s, t,d) = min
r∈Store(C,s,t,d)
Bins(C, s− r, t,d + 1). (A.1)
This identity can be easily veriﬁed by observing the following. The set r is the (possibly empty) subset of jobs that we
assign to the d + 1 slowest machine, and thus s − r is the set of jobs that have to be assigned to the remaining machines,
that is, none of these jobs is assigned to the d+ 1 slowest machine. In both cases, we have to guarantee that the makespan
is at most C and thus the identity follows from Deﬁnition 40.
Notice that (A.1) also suggests how to compute the corresponding assignment. Indeed, it suﬃces to keep track of the vec-
tor r∗ such that Bins(C, s, t,d) = Bins(C, s− r∗, t,d + 1) and r∗ ∈ Store(C, s, t,d). Such an r∗ is associated to Bins(C, s, t,d)
meaning that the d + 1 slowest machine is assigned the subset r∗ and the other jobs are assigned as in the solution asso-
ciated to Bins(C, s − r∗, t,d + 1). In order to guarantee that Exact assigns positive work to the fastest machines, we break
ties in a ﬁxed manner. In particular, we assign the vector 0
def= (0, . . . ,0), denoting the empty set of jobs, to Bins(C, s, t,d)
whenever Bins(C, s, t,d) = Bins(C, s, t,d + 1) = 0 (notice that 0 ∈ Store(C, s, t,d) and s− 0 = s).
The overall computation proceeds from d = n − 1 down to 1 and it ensures the following fundamental condition:
Lemma 41. Algorithm Exact is stable and it assigns positive work to the fastest machines.
Proof. Let d∗ = d∗(C,w, t) be the maximum d such that Bins(C,w, t,d) = 0. For every d < d∗ , we have Bins(C,w, t,d) = 0
and, by our ﬁxed tie breaking rule, the solution associated to Bins(C,w, t,d) is the same as the solution associated
to Bins(C,w, t,d∗). We next show that this solution assigns positive work to all but the d∗ slowest machines. Indeed,
Bins(C,w,d∗ + 1) = 1, thus implying that any solution which assigns no work to at least d∗ + 1 machines has cost more
than C . Since Bins(C,w, t,d∗) = 0, its associated solution has cost at most C and thus must assign positive work to at least
n− d∗ machines. By deﬁnition, this solution assigns no work to the d∗ slowest machines and thus each of the n− d∗ fastest
machines receives a positive work. 
Lemma 42. The running time of Exact is O (n ·m2k · k).
Proof. From (A.1) we derive a simple method to compute Bins(C, s, t,d) given the values Bins(C, s′, t,d + 1) for all s′ .
Indeed, it suﬃces to try all possible r, which are at most O (mk), check r ∈ Store(C, s, t,d) (this task takes O (k) time),
and decide in this way if Bins(C, s, t,d) = 0. So, for every d, we compute the O (mk) possible values Bins(C, s, t,d), one for
each s. Each of them can be computed in O (mk · k), given the pre-computed values for d + 1. The overall running time is
thus O (n ·m2k ·k). Recall that our algorithm will also keep track of the computations in order to reconstruct the assignment
(i.e., it records all r such that (A.1) holds). In doing this, it uses the afore mentioned ﬁxed tie breaking rule where r = 0 is
used whenever possible. Obviously the running time remains O (n ·m2k · k). 
The previous lemma proves the ﬁrst part of Lemma 26. In order to prove the second part, we show that k = O (1) for
the case of bounded speeds and for every ﬁxed ε > 0. By our rounding and by the deﬁnition of large jobs, the rounded jobs
can take k ∈ O (log1+ε WmaxεC ) different values. Since Oracleδ invokes Exact only for C, t, and W satisfying C Wmax · tmin,
where tmin denotes the smallest element in t , we have k ∈ O (log1+ε 1εtmin ). The hypothesis on the machine speeds says that
there exists a constant s¯ such that si ∈ [1, s¯]. That is, ti = 1/si  tmin  1/s¯, thus implying k ∈ O (log1+ε s¯ε ). We conclude that
k = O (1) for bounded speeds and for ﬁxed ε > 0, thus yielding Lemma 26.
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